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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a consolidated appeal from the summary dismissal of Appellant Dennis Nielson's 
initial and successive petitions for post-conviction relief. (Supreme Court Order consolidating 
appeals entered August 12, 2013.) Mr. Nielson's petitions should not have been summarily 
dismissed because he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he received ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to request a competency evaluation once he knew 
of Mr. Nielson's mental health issues and received Mr. Nielson's mental health records prior to 
trial - a failure that continued throughout the remainder of the case, including the sentencing 
hearing. Furthermore, appellate relief should be granted because Mr. Nielson did raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel and his 
constitutional right to testify when trial counsel failed to preserve a meritorious appellate issue as 
to whether the district court erred in allowing admission ofIRE 404(b) evidence if Mr. Nielson 
testified at his trial by making an off er of proof as to what his testimony would have been absent 
the erroneous ruling. United States Const. Amends. 5, 6 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I, sec. 13. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
In 2004, nine-year-old N.B. accused Mr. Nielson of having touched her vagina over her 
clothing while giving her a piggy back ride by a canal adjacent to her house at some unspecified 
time during spring, summer, or fall of 2002. R 40446 p. 63-65 (Trial Tr. p. 152, ln. 20 - p. 157, 
ln. 17); p. 69 (Trial Tr. p. 173, ln. 7-13); p. 74, (Trial Tr. p. 194, ln. 6-9); p. 78 (Trial Tr. p. 212, 
ln. 9-16). N.B.'s father, who shares a very close and loving relationship with N.B., was present 
at the time of the ride and could observe and hear his daughter and Mr. Nielson. N.B.'s father 
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did not see or hear anything improper and at the end of the ride, N.B. was not upset at all. R 
40446 p. 79 (Trial Tr. p. 213, ln. 7 - p. 215, ln. 4); p. 81-83 (Trial Tr. p. 223, ln. 22 - p. 229, ln. 
16). 
When N.B. accused him, Mr. Nielson voluntarily spoke to the police and denied both to 
the police and to his ex-wife, with whom he shared a very close relationship and who had 
accompanied him to the police station, any wrongdoing. However, he was already on parole. 
And, he left the area after his interview with the police. R 40446 p. 57 (Trial Tr. p. 127, ln. 25 -
p. 128, ln. 3); p. 88-89 (Trial Tr. p. 252, ln. 5 - p. 254, ln. 7, p. 255, ln. 20-25); p. 90 (Trial Tr. p. 
259, ln. 5-7); p. 113 (Sentencing Tr. p. 350, ln. 13 - p. 351, ln. 1). 
In 2006, Mr. Nielson came before the district court for a motions hearing. At that time, 
the court heard some argument as to whether testimony of victims in a Cassia County case and a 
Boise County case should be admitted at trial. R 40446 p. 26-28 (Trial Tr. p. 1, ln. 1 - p. 8, ln. 
25). See also, R 33823, p. 38-40. 
A few days later, at a second hearing, Mr. Nielson requested appointment of substitute 
counsel. R 40446 p. 28-37 (Trial Tr. p. 10, ln. 4 - p. 46, ln. 10). When the court denied 
substitute counsel, Mr. Nielson elected to represent himself. R 40446, p. 37-40 (Trial Tr. p. 37, 
ln. 11 - p. 60, ln. 4). 
Of importance to this appeal, during the discussions between Mr. Nielson, counsel and 
the court on the question of representation, Mr. Nielson reported that during the past year he had 
begun having psychotic events and so he had given power of attorney to his ex-wife to allow her 
to communicate with his appointed counsel. R 40446 p. 29 (Trial Tr. p. 15, ln. 1-23). After 
hearing this, the court asked counsel whether he had reason to believe that Mr. Nielson was not 
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competent, and counsel replied, "There is no question in my mind that he is competent to 
proceed today." R 40446 p. 34 (Trial Tr. p. 34, ln. 14-23). 
Upon further questioning by the court, Mr. Nielson reported that he had been in the 
psychiatric unit at the prison. The prison medicated him, but it did not seem to work. The prison 
released him back into general population six weeks before the hearing, not because he was well, 
but because he was not considered a danger to himself or others. However, he had experienced 
some sort of psychotic break. Mr. Nielson also told the court that during a lucid interval during 
this time, he gave his ex-wife power of attorney to speak with the public defender's office on his 
behalf because he could not handle his own affairs. R 40446 p. 35 (Trial Tr. p. 38, ln. 8 - p. 39, 
ln. 25). 
Later, in the discussions about representation, the court instructed defense counsel that if 
he remained on the case, he should discuss Mr. Nielson's status with the psychiatric unit at the 
prison. R 40446 p. 36 (Trial Tr. p. 42, ln. 16-19). However, the court also stated that its 
discussion with Mr. Nielson was rational and that if there were any psychological issues they had 
not been demonstrated. R 40446 p. 36 (Trial Tr. 43, ln. 15-21). 
On the first day of trial, Mr. Nielson asked for a continuance because he had just been 
diagnosed with schizophrenia by Dr. Kruzich. In his written motion, Mr. Nielson stated that he 
was hearing voices and experiencing hallucinations, confusion, difficulty reading, paranoia, and 
memory loss. He also stated, "That the defendant Dennis L. Nielson has been and/or is not 
competent to prepare for and/or assist in his own defense." R 33823 p. 42. 1 However, Mr. 
1 The district court took judicial notice of R 33823 in its order entered May 9, 2013. R 
40446 p. 442. And the record is before this Court as an exhibit on appeal. R 40446 p. 431. 
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Nielson did not have a signed letter from the doctor and so the court denied the motion to 
continue. R 40446 p. 43 (Trial Tr. p. 71, ln. 24 - p. 72, ln. 6). 
In the last minute discussions with the court prior to jury selection, Mr. Nielson stated 
that he believed that his schizophrenia had a lot to do with his difficulties with previously 
appointed counsel. He said that he has difficulty remembering things, especially in stressful 
situations, and that he is told that he gets upset and does things of which he is unaware. Mr. 
Nielsen said again that he had given his ex-wife power of attorney to meet with previously 
appointed counsel because he needed help in communicating. R 40446 p. 44 (Trial Tr. p. 75, ln. 
3-25). 
Thereafter, Mr. Nielson asked the court to reappoint the public defender, which the court 
did. R 40446 p. 45 (Trial Tr. p. 78, ln. 3-10). Counsel asked for 15-20 minutes to go to his 
office and to visit with Mr. Nielson. Then, the trial began. Counsel never asked for a 
competency evaluation. R 40446 p. 45 (Trial. Tr. p. 78, ln. 20 - p. 80, In. 10). 
Followingjury selection, the state asked for a ruling on its IRE 404(b) motion. R 40446, 
p. 48 (Trial Tr. p. 90, ln. 11-15). In response, the court held that testimony regarding prior 
offenses would be allowed if Mr. Nielson testified. R 40446 p. 60-62 (Trial Tr. p. 139, ln. 10 - p. 
146, ln. 18.) 
Ths state built its case around the testimony ofN.B. She testified that some four years 
earlier, sometime in the summer or fall, Mr. Nielson, a friend of her father's, took her for a piggy 
back ride to a canal adjacent to her home. She said that during the ride he touched her vagina 
with his fingers. However, when she asked him to stop, he did so. R 40446 p. 63-65 (Trial Tr. p. 
150, ln. 25 - p. 159, In. 16). 
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At the time of the ride, N.B. lived with her father and had sporadic contact with her 
mother. Although she and her father were and remain extremely close, she did not tell him about 
the contact. And, in fact, he was in the yard of the house and observed this piggy back ride, 
which he said probably happened in the spring. He did not see or hear anything inappropriate 
and did not observe N.B. acting upset or anything other than normally thereafter. R 40446 p. 79-
80 (Trial Tr. p. 213, ln. 1 - p. 215, ln. 6; p. 220, ln. 10-12); p. 82-83 (Trial Tr. p. 226, ln. 6 - p. 
229, ln. 16). 
N.B. did not say anything for a couple of years. Then she accused Mr. Nielson. N.B. 
testified that she made her accusations to her mother, not her father. She said she decided to say 
something because Mr. Nielson may have recently entered her house while she was home but her 
father was out. R 40446 p. 65- 66 (Trial Tr. p. 160, ln. 13 - p. 163, ln. 7). 
N .B.' s father testified that Mr. Nielson was an intelligent man who was a good friend. 
N.B.'s father also testified consistently with N.B. that N.B. and he were and remain very close 
and that her contact with her mother was limited. In fact, eventually N.B. was spending no time 
at all with her mother. R 40446 p. 80-81 (Trial Tr. p. 220, ln. 7 - p. 221, ln. 6). 
Mr. Nielson's boss testified that he was a very good employee and reliable person. R 
40446 p. 85-88 (Trial Tr. p. 240, ln. 22 - p. 250, ln. 25). 
Mr. Nielson's ex-wife testified that she went with him to the police station for an 
interview when N.B. made her accusations. Mr. Nielson stated to her that he had not touched 
N.B. in an inappropriate way. R 40446 p. 88-91 (Trial Tr. p. 251, In. 5 - p. 261, In. 25). 
The jury also heard that after the interview at the police station, Mr. Nielson left his job 
and went missing for two years. R 40446 p. 91 (Trial Tr. p. 263, In. 15 - p. 264, In. 12). 
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In its closing the state argued its theme that N.B. was credible and that her testimony 
established lewd conduct with a minor. R 40446 p. 100-105 (Trial Tr. p. 300, ln. 9 - p. 318, ln. 
11). The state's argument concluded: 
After examining all of the reasons put forth by the state, I'm going to ask you to 
believe this child. Believe [N.B.]. Her testimony establishes lewd conduct with a 
minor. He is guilty. 
R 40446, p. 105 (Trial Tr. p. 318, ln. 1-4). 
Defense counsel argued that N.B. was not credible: 
Your primary role in this case as jurors is to assess credibility and determine 
whether or not this allegation by [N.B.] is truthful or not. I'll suggest to you that if 
you infer what she did and how she did it and her reactions, that you will agree 
with me this is a false allegation. 
R 40446 p. 105 (Trial Tr. p. 319, ln. 7-12). 
Counsel continued: "Bottom line: It's whether or not you believe [N.B.], period. That's 
the beginning, that's the middle, and that's the end. That's it." R 40446 p. 106 (Trial Tr. p. 321, 
ln. 7-9). Counsel then suggested that N.B. was motivated to create a false allegation because she 
was not getting any attention from her mother. R 40446 p. 106 (Trial Tr. p. 324, ln. 10-25); p. 
108 (Trial Tr. p. 329, ln. 22-24 ). 
After deliberations, the jury convicted Mr. Nielson. R 40446 p. 111 (Trial Tr. p. 341, In. 
6-10). 
The case proceeded to sentencing. Mr. Nielson requested the preparation of a new PSI 
and a psychosexual evaluation, but the court declined. R 40446 p. 111 (Trial Tr. p. 344, ln. 1-
19). The court imposed a sentence of 50 years comprised of 30 fixed followed by 20 
indeterminate. R 40446 p. 115 (Trial Tr. p. 359, ln. 4-22). 
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A direct appeal followed and the judgment and conviction were affirmed in State v. 
Nielson, D. No. 33823. A copy of the Court of Appeals' unpublished decision is attached as 
Appendix A to this Brief. 
In the direct appeal, Mr. Nielson challenged the district court's failure to adequately 
inquire into his competency to represent himself pro se, the court's denial of his motion for a 
continuance, and the court's order that his mental health records be sent to standby counsel rather 
than to himself. The Court of Appeals did not address the claims of error, holding instead that 
even if error was assumed, Mr. Nielson had not shown prejudice attendant to his 18 days as a pro 
se defendant. 
The Court of Appeals further held that the district court did not err in denying an updated 
PSI and a psychosexual evaluation and that the court did not impose an excessive sentence. 
Thereafter, Mr. Nielson filed a timely prose petition for post-conviction relief raising 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. R 39594 p. 7-21. 
The district court appointed counsel to represent Mr. Nielson. R 39594 p. 96. And the 
state filed an answer. R 39594 p. 108-117. Thereafter, counsel filed an amended petition. R 
39594 p. 141-151. 
The amended petition raised the following claims of import to this appeal: 
1) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to file a motion for a competency 
evaluation prior to trial; 
2) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to file a motion for a mental health 
evaluation prior to sentencing; 
3) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to appeal the 404(b) ruling even 
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though the same issue was pending at the time of Mr. Nielson's appeal in State v. Grist, 147 
Idaho 49,205 P.3d 1185 (2009) (Mr. Grist's conviction was vacated as a result of the erroneous 
admission of prior bad acts evidence). 
R 39594 p. 145-149. 
The state filed an answer to the amended petition. R 39594 p. 173-180. The state also 
filed a motion for summary dismissal on the grounds that Mr. Nielson had not stated a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. R 39594 p. 181-182. Of import to this appeal, the state 
argued that Mr. Nielson's claim that counsel was deficient in not requesting a competency 
evaluation should be rejected because the record showed that counsel believed he was competent 
and because Mr. Nielson failed to articulate or identify how he was unable to assist his attorney. 
R 39594 p. 197. The state also argued that the claim that counsel was deficient for failing to 
request an evaluation prior to sentencing should be rejected because Mr. Nielson had failed to 
show either deficiency or prejudice. R 39594 p. 198. Lastly, the state argued that Mr. Nielson's 
claim that appellate counsel was deficient in not appealing the erroneous 404(b) ruling should be 
rejected because Mr. Nielson had not offered evidence as to what his testimony would have been 
and further because the jury would not be likely to believe his testimony anyway because of his 
prior convictions for grand theft and fraud. R 39594 p. 198. 
Mr. Nielson filed an affidavit from Greg Silvey regarding the claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. Mr. Silvey noted that Grist would have required reversal of Mr. 
Nielson's conviction since it overruled in relevant part the caselaw upon which the district court 
relied in holding that evidence regarding prior offenses was admissible. Mr. Silvey further noted 
that the harm from the erroneous district court ruling included the deprivation of Mr. Nielson's 
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Fifth Amendment right to testify. R 39594 p. 199-217. 
In response to Mr. Silvey's affidavit, the state filed a supplemental memorandum arguing 
that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel could not be established because trial counsel had 
failed to preserve the 404(b) issue for appeal by entering an offer of proof into the record as to 
what Mr. Nielson's testimony would have been had he testified. R 39594 p. 218-224. 
Following a hearing, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Nielson's petition in part. 
R 39594 p. 264-268. Of relevance to this appeal, the district court dismissed the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in not obtaining a mental health examination on the basis that 
there was no evidence that Mr. Nielson had been incompetent. The court wrote: 
If Mr. Nielson can show to the Court that he was schizophrenic and not able to 
appreciate or understand the proceedings, that his counsel was aware of that 
diagnosis, and such a diagnosis exists, perhaps then the Defendant can amend his 
pleadings to reflect such facts. The same is true of the Defendant's claim that an 
LC.§ 19-2523 evaluation would have changed the outcome of the sentencing or 
the outcome of the case. There is nothing in the record to show that Mr. Nielson 
is mentally ill now or in the past. 
R 39594 p. 267. 
The court set the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for an evidentiary 
hearing. R 39594 p. 267. 
Thereafter, the state filed a motion to reconsider, a post-discovery motion for dismissal of 
the remaining claims, and a motion for summary dismissal. The district court responded by 
issuing a memorandum decision dismissing the petition, but giving Mr. Nielson twenty days to 
file an amended petition. R 39594 p. 360-374. Ofrelevance to this appeal, the court wrote: 
... Petitioner did not preserve the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence issue for appeal and the 
issue would not have been reviewable on the merits. Accordingly, Petitioner 
cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence a reasonable probability that, but 
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for Mr. Curtis' [ appellate counsel] failure to raise the issue on appeal, that 
Petitioner's conviction would have been reversed on an issue that was 
unreviewable. Though it would be interesting to engage in a colloquy over 
whether or not the Court's ruling on the 404(b) evidence at trial stands or falls 
under the later holding in Grist ... By not testifying or making an offer of proof at 
trial as to what he would have testified to, the Court of Appeals could not have 
conducted an analysis as to whether this Court's error, if any, prejudiced 
Petitioner .... 
R 39594 p. 372. 
Instead of filing an amended petition, counsel filed a notice of appeal. R 39594 p. 377-
380. 
Thereafter, the court issued a final judgment. R 39594 p. 381. And, Mr. Nielson then 
filed an amended notice of appeal. R 39594 p. 382-385. 
While that appeal was pending, Mr. Nielson filed a successive petition. R 40446 p. 6-11. 
In the successive petition, Mr. Nielson raised the claim that trial counsel was ineffective in 
failing to make an offer of proof in the trial court so as to preserve the 404(b) issue for appellate 
review. R 40446 p. 7. He further raised that claim that trial counsel was ineffective in not asking 
for a competency evaluation once he received Mr. Nielson's mental health records prior to trial. 
R 40446 p. 7. Mr. Nielson alleged not only ineffective assistance of counsel, but also that his 
constitutional right to testify in his own behalf was violated by the erroneous evidentiary ruling. 
R40446 p. 8. 
Mr. Nielson's successive petition set out that post-conviction counsel had been 
ineffective in failing to allege these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, especially when 
the judge had specifically noted the viability of the Grist claim had it been preserved and given 
post-conviction counsel permission to file an amended petition. R 40446 p. 8. 
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In his affidavit in support of the successive petition, Mr. Nielson stated that during the 
trial he was suffering from auditory and visual hallucinations, that in the months prior to trial, he 
had been suffering from psychotic events and had difficulty in remembering and organizing his 
thoughts. He further stated that during the trial he was moved to the Ada County Jail where he 
did not receive his schizophrenia medication. R 40446 p. 12. 
Mr. Nielson set out the testimony he would have given at trial had he been allowed to 
testify. He stated that he did not molest N.B. He further set out the defense he could have 
presented had he been able to testify at trial. R 40446 p. 12-14. 
Mr. Nielson's testimony would have been that N.B.'s mother was the moving factor 
behind the false allegations against Mr. Nielson. Just prior to the false allegations, Mr. Nielson 
had brokered a deal for N.B. 'smother to sell some valuable guitars that had previously belonged 
to the rock group "The Who" to Dee Lynn under an agreement of a $1000 security deposit. 
However, N.B.'s mother, a methamphetamine addict, spent the $1000 on methamphetamine and 
so was unable to return the security deposit. Therefore, Ms. Lynn kept the guitars. This caused 
N.B. 's mother to threaten both Ms. Lynn and Mr. Nielson. Ms. Bryant told Mr. Nielson that she 
would "destroy" him if the guitars were not returned. R 40446 p. 12-13. 
Mr. Nielson stated in his affidavit that N.B. 's father had contacted him about the guitars, 
urged him to return them, and warned him that N.B.'s mother had a history of using N.B. to 
manipulate others. R 40446 p. 12.2 
2 Mr. Nielson had, in fact, tried to explain this defense to counsel and the court at the 
time of his trial. During the hearing on Mr. Nielson's motion for new counsel, the Court asked 
Mr. Nielson about defenses he believed counsel was not putting forth. Mr. Nielson replied: 
That it conveys reasonable doubt. And to be real honest with you, the girl's 
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mother - the girl who made the accusation's mother -
Has tried to blackmail me. 
Because she- she had these two guitars that belonged to the group The Who. 
Very valuable, but they weren't valuable unless they could be authenticated. 
Well, she had videotape that authenticated because she was dating one of those 
persons that was in that group at some point in her life. Then, she became a crank 
addict, and her life apparently, at this time, had fallen all apart. And she offered 
me to see - to sell those guitars to me. I knew a person who was interested in 
collectibles, so she sold the guitars to me with - what she did was she gave me the 
two guitars with a $1000 deposit to take to show to this person which I did. 
This was all within a month or two of the - it's hard to say. 
Somewhere in 2002, Your Honor. 
She wanted the guitars back because we made a deal for her to sell the guitars to 
me, but then she refused to give the tape which authenticated them. So, they're 
worthless to me. And then, she refused to - at that point, she wanted the guitars 
back, but the $1000 was already gone. So, she wouldn't give the guitars back. 
She wouldn't give the tape . 
. . . And here it goes on again. The guitars - then I found out the guitars were 
stolen. 
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Mr. Nielson also set out in his affidavit other testimony he would have given, including 
testimony that throughout 2002 he had a serious foot injury and surgery and was unable to walk 
without a pronounced limp. At the time he met N.B. 's father, he had pins and sutures in his foot. 
Also, at that time, Lester Smith and Maynard Hites (a registered sex offender) lived with N.B. 
and her father. R 40446 p. 13. 
Mr. Nielson would have also offered testimony to counter the state's theory that he had 
abandoned his family when he left the area after the false accusation. He would have testified 
that he celebrated Christmas 2004 in Ontario, Oregon, with his two sons, his ex-wife, and others. 
In 2005, he was living in Emmett, Idaho and his sons stayed with him at times. Moreover, he 
gave money to his ex-wife to pay for his sons' support. And, in 2005, he lived with his ex-wife's 
father in Kooskia, Idaho, and again his sons stayed with him. R 40446 p. 13. 
Not stolen, excuse me. She had reported them stolen, collected the insurance, hid 
the guitars, and now, she was selling them to me. The information that they were 
stolen came from the father who told me - tried to get me to give them back to 
her. She kept trying to get me to give the guitars back by having sex with her. 
And, basically, that's what her - she tried over and over through inviting me over, 
trying to get me to have sex with her and was using that - that situation to try to 
get those guitars back, and I -
That's what she was - she was adamant on getting those guitars back. 
Her and her husband tried - her ex-husband tried to get it back. 
R 40446 p. 31 (Trial Tr. p. 21, In. 7 - p. 24, In. 2). 
Upon this recitation, the district court concluded "So, it's not blackmail regarding these 
charges. It's blackmail regarding these guitars." R 40446, p. 31 (Trial Tr. p. 24, In. 3-4). 
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Mr. Nielson would have also testified regarding how the statements ofN.B. were not 
consistent over time supporting the defense that N.B.'s mother had generated this false 
accusation of offense against N.B. in accord with her threat to destroy Mr. Nielson. R 40446 p. 
14. 
Mr. Nielson also supported his successive petition with medical records from the prison 
showing his diagnosis of schizophrenia, possible bi-polar, and anxiety. That record was signed 
by Dr. Kruzich and was dated November 6, 2006. R 40446, p. 17. 
Mr. Nielson also presented the order releasing his medical records to his defense counsel, 
dated November 1, 2006. R 40446, p. 18-19. That order was faxed to IDOC on November 1, 
2006. R 40446, p. 20.3 Mr. Nielson's trial commenced on November 13, 2006. R 40446, p. 22. 
The district court appointed counsel to represent Mr. Nielson on the successive petition. 
R 40446 p. 128. 
The state then filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal. R 40446 p. 130-133. 
The state argued that the petition should be dismissed because it was a second petition filed after 
the statute oflimitations. R 40446, p. 132. 
Thereafter, the court filed a notice of intent to dismiss the petition. The court stated in its 
notice that initial post-conviction counsel was not ineffective for failing to allege that trial 
counsel was ineffective in not making an offer of proof of what Mr. Nielson would have testified 
3 In footnote 3 of State v. Nielson, D. No. 33823, the Court of Appeals states: "Nielson's 
IDOC mental health records do not support his claim of current psychotic symptoms." However, 
the IDOC record offered in support of Mr. Nielson's successive petition, R 40446, p. 17, was 
never presented to the district court by trial counsel and is not contained in the record of the 
direct appeal. R 33823 p. 90-91. Indeed, the district court denied Mr. Nielson's motion to 
continue the trial precisely because no records were presented in support of the motion. R 40446 
p. 43 (Trial Tr. p. 71, ln. 24 - p. 72, ln. 6). 
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to at trial absent the evidentiary error because Mr. Nielson was not deprived of his right to testify; 
rather, he waived the right. Further the court stated that because trial counsel's failure to make 
an offer of proof was known at the time the amended original petition was filed, Mr. Nielson was 
barred from raising it as ineffective assistance in a successive petition. I.C. § 19-4908. The court 
also stated that the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails as a matter of law because 
Mr. Nielson could not show that: ( 1) if trial counsel had made an offer of proof, properly 
preserving the IRE 404(b) issue for appeal, appellate counsel would have raised the issue on 
appeal; (2) if appellate counsel raised the issue on appeal, the appellate court would have found 
an abuse of discretion in the district court's IRE 404(b) decision; (3) as a result, Mr. Nielson was 
denied his constitutional right to testify; (4) but for the deprivation of the right to testify, Mr. 
Nielson would have testified; and (5) if he had testified, the jury would have acquitted him. R 
40446 p. 154-162. 
The district court further stated in its notice that the claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective in not asking for a competency evaluation was barred under I.C. § 19-4908 because it 
was previously raised in the amended original petition and adjudicated. R 40446 p. 163. 
Thereafter appointed counsel filed a motion for judicial notice of all the records, 
transcripts, and exhibits in the direct appeal and in the previous post-conviction proceeding. R 
40446 p. 166-279. 
After the district court granted the motion for judicial notice, counsel inexplicably filed a 
notice of appeal and motion for the appointment of appellate counsel. R 40446 p. 280-287. 
Mr. Nielson then filed a prose motion for new counsel and/or leave to respond prose to 
the notice of intent to dismiss noting that counsel did not appear to understand post-conviction 
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process as it is not appropriate to appeal before the court has entered a final order in the case. R 
40446 p. 288-289. 
In the meantime, this Court remanded the case back to the district court because there was 
not a final order. R 40446 p. 290. 
Upon receipt of the case, the district court granted Mr. Nielson's motion to proceed pro 
se. R 40446 p. 291-294. Mr. Nielson then filed a motion for appointment of new counsel, R 
40446 p. 302-303, which the district court granted. R 40446 p. 304-305. 
At a status hearing, new appointed counsel told the court that he would not be filing any 
response to the notice of intent to dismiss. Thereupon, Mr. Nielson asked again to proceed pro 
se, and the court granted that request. R 40446 p. 381. Thereafter,pro bono counsel appeared on 
Mr. Nielson's behalf. R 40446 p. 394-395. 
A second motion for judicial notice was filed. R 40446 p. 396-397. And, a response to 
the notice of intent to dismiss was filed. R 40446 p. 401-411. 
In the response, Mr. Nielson addressed each of the district court's reasons for summary 
dismissal: 
1) The district court was incorrect in its assertion that Mr. Nielson was not deprived of 
the right to testify, but rather waived the right. Mr. Nielson did not make a voluntary wavier of 
his constitutional right - he was coerced into not testifying by the district court's erroneous IRE 
404(b) ruling. R 40446 p. 401-404. 
2) The district court was incorrect that the ineffective assistance of counsel/right to testify 
claim could not be raised in a successive petition. The claim was raisable because the failure to 
raise the claim in the initial petition was a result of ineffective assistance of the original post-
16 
conviction counsel. R 40446 p. 405-409. 
3) Mr. Nielson set out in detail how his claim of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
did not fail as a matter of law. Specifically, Mr. Nielson set out the proper standard of review 
and demonstrated how counsel's failure to make an offer of proof to preserve appellate review of 
the erroneous IRE 404(b) ruling resulted in prejudice. R 40446 p. 408-409. 
Mr. Nielson supported his response with his affidavit which set out the testimony he 
would have presented at trial but for the erroneous IRE 404(b) ruling. Specifically, Mr. Nielson 
would have testified that he did not molest N.B.; that N.B.'s mother had threatened to "destroy" 
his life over the guitar dispute and the details of that dispute; that N.B. 's mother carried out this 
threat by fabricating an allegation from N.B. against Mr. Nielson; that during 2002, Mr. Nielson 
had a serious foot injury and foot surgery which left him unable to walk without a limp; that 
N.B.'s father gave false testimony regarding his housing situation including not telling the jury 
that a registered sex offender, Maynard Hites, lived with him and N.B.; and that Mr. Nielson did 
not abandon his family after the false accusations but in fact spent a lot of time with them and 
provided material and emotional support. R 40446 p. 414-416. 
Mr. Nielson also supported his response with the affidavit of his direct appeal counsel, 
Justin Curtis. Mr. Curtis stated that he did not raise the IRE 404(b) issue on appeal because it 
was not preserved; that at the time of Mr. Nielson's appeal, he also represented Harold Grist; that 
Mr. Nielson's IRE 404(b) issue was similar to Mr. Grist's; that had the IRE 404(b) issue been 
preserved in this case it would have been raised; that like Mr. Grist, Mr. Nielson would have 
been granted appellate relief. R 40446 p. 417-419. 
Thereafter, the district court granted the second motion for judicial notice and then 
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dismissed Mr. Nielson's petition. R 40446 p. 420-422. 
This appeal timely follows. R 40446 p. 425-428. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Nielson's initial petition for 
post-conviction relief because he did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel 
was ineffective in failing to request a competency evaluation? 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Nielson's successive petition for 
post-conviction relief because he did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel 
was ineffective in not preserving the IRE 404(b) error for appeal and whether the district court 
denied him the right to testify by its erroneous ruling? 
A. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing the Claim that Trial Counsel was 
Ineffective in Failing to Request a Competency Evaluation 
1. Standard of Review 
A post-conviction relief action is a civil proceeding in which the applicant 
bears the burden to prove the allegations upon which the request for relief 
is based. An order for summary disposition of a post-conviction relief 
application under LC.§ 19-4906(c) is the procedural equivalent of 
summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Therefore, 
summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition is appropriate only if 
there exists no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. If a genuine 
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. On 
review of a summary dismissal, [the appellate court] must examine the 
record to determine whether the trial court correctly found that there 
existed no genuine issue of material fact and that the State was entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw. [The Court] liberally construe[s] the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. However, [the 
Court does] not give evidentiary value to mere conclusory allegations that 
are unsupported by admissible evidence. 
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Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 881, 187 P .3d 1253, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008) ( citations omitted). 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction relief petitioner must 
establish both deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different result. Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
2. Argument 
Mr. Nielson raised the claim in his initial petition that trial counsel was ineffective in 
failing to request a competency evaluation both before trial and before sentencing. In summarily 
dismissing the claim, the court wrote that "if Mr. Nielson can show to the Court that he was 
schizophrenic and not able to appreciate or understand the proceedings, that his counsel was 
aware of such diagnosis and that such a diagnosis exists" he could amend his petition. R 39594 
p. 267. 
Initial post-conviction counsel failed to present the requested evidence. However, Mr. 
Nielson did present the requested evidence in his successive petition. Mr. Nielson presented the 
medical record from IDOC dated November 6, 2006, signed by Dr. Kruzich, diagnosing him as 
schizophrenic, possibly bi-polar, and suffering from anxiety. R 40446, p. 17. Mr. Nielson's trial 
commenced on November 13, 2006, and trial counsel had an order allowing him access to the 
prison medical records as well as Mr. Nielson's own statements regarding the diagnosis prior to 
that date. R 40446 p. 20-22. Moreover, trial counsel was aware of Mr. Nielson's grant of a 
power of attorney to his ex-wife because Mr. Nielson was unable as a result of mental illness to 
communicate with him and assist in his own defense. R 40446 p. 29 (Trial Tr. p. 15, ln. 1-23). 
This evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel's failure to 
request a competency evaluation prior to trial and prior to sentencing denied Mr. Nielson his 
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state and federal constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel. 
Idaho Code § 18-210 states: "No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks 
capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, 
convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity 
endures." Likewise, I. C. § 19-2523 requires the judge to weigh mental condition as a sentencing 
consideration if the defendant's mental condition is a significant issue. I. C. § 19-2523. 
These statutes are intended to protect the constitutional due process right to a fair trial. 
"The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or 
convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial." 
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 62, 90 P.3d 278,287 (2003), citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 
375, 86 S.Ct. 836 (1966). The test for competency is "whether a defendant has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether 
he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 (1960). Idaho Code 18-210 is a restatement of the 
Dusky test. State v. Lovelace, supra. 
In this case, Mr. Nielson gave trial counsel ample reason to doubt his competence. Just 
prior to trial, Mr. Nielson informed the court and counsel that he had recently been released from 
the psychiatric unit of the prison - on the basis that he was not dangerous, not on the basis that he 
was not ill. He further informed court and counsel that he had been given a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, that he had given his ex-wife a power of attorney to act on his behalf in 
conversations with defense counsel because he was having difficulties in communicating, and 
that he was having difficulty in organizing his thoughts and in remembering. R 40446 p. 29 
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(Trial Tr. p. 15, In. 1-23); p. 35 (Trial Tr. p. 38, In. 8 - p. 39, In. 25); p. 43 (Trial Tr. p. 71, In. 24 -
p. 72, In. 6). 
In the face of all this evidence of incompetence, defense counsel never sought out any 
competency evaluation. Counsel never sought any expert advice at all. Rather, counsel told the 
court, "There is no question in my mind that he is competent to proceed today." R 40446 p. 34 
(Trial Tr. p. 34, In. 14-23). 
Counsel's response was objectively deficient. State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774,229 P.3d 
379 (Ct. App. 2009), is instructive. In Hawkins, the Court of Appeals held that the district court 
erred in not sua sponte ordering a competency evaluation in light of Hawkins' behavior which 
consistently raised questions about his competency. The Court of Appeals wrote: "Although no 
particular facts signal a defendant's incompetence, suggestive evidence includes the defendant's 
demeanor before the trial judge, irrational behavior of the defendant, and available medical 
evaluations of the defendant's competence to stand trial." 148 Idaho at 778,229 P.3d at 384, 
citing Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S.Ct. 896, 908 (1975).4 
In this case, Mr. Nielson repeatedly told the court and counsel that he was suffering from 
schizophrenia and that the illness was impairing his ability to stand trial. But, counsel ignored 
that and did not ask for an evaluation. Counsel continued to ignore the problem even after he 
obtained Dr. Kuzich's diagnosis of schizophrenia. As in Hawkins, this was unreasonable. The 
failure to request a competency evaluation was deficient performance, or at the very least a 
material question of fact was raised as to whether the failure to request an evaluation was 
4 Interestingly, Mr. Nielson's public defender was also the public defender in Hawkins, 
and the same district court judge presided at both trials. Id. 
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deficient performance. See also, Afullins v. Hopper, 249 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 1978) (defense counsel 
ineffective when even though aware of defendant's history of schizophrenia and diagnosis as 
psychotic he advised a guilty plea); People v. Frazier, 114 A.D. 2d 1038, 495 N.Y.S.2d 478 (2d 
Dep't 1985) ( defense counsel ineffective in not submitting an order requesting a psychiatric 
examination for client whose PSI revealed that she had been found to be suffering from chronic 
schizophrenic process). 
Further, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the deficient performance 
was prejudicial. A diagnosis of schizophrenia often results in a finding of incompetency. See 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 427-28, 825 P.2d 1081, 1083-84 (1991). Psychosis "is the most 
common diagnosis for persons found incompetent to stand trial, and is a characteristic symptom 
of schizophrenia." Thomas Grisso, Evaluating Competencies: Forensic Assessments and 
Instruments 70 (2d ed. 2003). Mr. Nielson had a diagnosis of schizophrenia and further 
expressed repeatedly that his illness was preventing him from communicating with his attorney. 
An inability to consult with an attorney renders a defendant incompetent to stand trial. Dusky, 
supra; LC. § 18-210. It is reasonably probable that had counsel requested a competency 
evaluation, a different outcome would have been obtained. The trial would have been postponed 
to allow the evaluation and it is reasonably probable that Mr. Nielson would have been found 
incompetent to proceed. See State v. Hawkins, supra, vacating Mr. Hawkins' conviction after the 
district court abused its discretion in not sua sponte ordering a psychiatric evaluation and 
conducting a hearing to determine competency. 
Mr. Nielson did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to request a competency evaluation either before trial or before sentencing. 
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Therefore, the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petitions for post-conviction relief. 
B. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Nielson's Successive Petition 
Which Raised a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether Counsel was Ineffective in 
not Preserving the IRE 404(b) Error for Appeal and Whether the District Court Denied 
Him the Right to Testify by its Erroneous Ruling 
l. Standard of Review 
The standard of review set out above applies: summary dismissal of a post-conviction 
petition is appropriate only if there exists no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in 
the applicant's favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. If a genuine factual issue is 
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Nevarez v. State, supra. 
Also, as noted above, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction 
relief petitioner must establish both deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a 
different result. Strickland v. Washington, supra. 
2. Argument 
The district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Nielson's successive petition 
because Mr. Nielson did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to preserve the erroneous IRE 404(b) issue for appeal and as to whether the 
district court denied him the right to testify by its erroneous ruling. 
a) Mr. Nielson's Decision to not Testify was Due to the District 
Court's Erroneous IRE 404(b) Decision 
Initially, the district court was incorrect in its determination that Mr. Nielson waived his 
right to testify. R 40446 p. 158. Mr. Nielson wanted to testify but could not because of the 
district court ruling erroneously admitting IRE 404(b) evidence if he testified. R 40446 p. 414-
416. While trial counsel advised Mr. Nielson not to testify, Mr. Nielson was not required to 
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follow counsel's advice. "Although a defendant can and should consult with counsel about the 
risks and benefits of testifying, the ultimate decision of whether to do so much be left to the 
defendant." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,604,200 P.3d 1148, 1153 (2009). In other words, 
trial counsel may not refuse to allow a criminal defendant to testify. What caused Mr. Nielson to 
decide not to testify was the trial court's erroneous 404(b) ruling. 
The absence of a voluntary waiver is shown by a portion of the trial transcript quoted by 
the district court in its notice of intent to dismiss. Mr. Nielson told the district court that he was 
not going to testify because of the IRE 404(b) ruling: "And what I understand about your ruling 
this morning, I that, if it stands that way, then it's in my best interest, from what I understand, to 
not testify." R 40466 p. 158. The decision to not testify to avoid the consequences of the trial 
court's erroneous ruling was not a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to 
testify because it was compelled by the court's erroneous ruling. 
Failure to testify is not a waiver of the right to testify when it is compelled by an 
erroneous trial court ruling. But, defense counsel needs to make an appropriate record for 
appellate review: 
In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling for appellate review, the party 
assigning error to the ruling must make a sufficient record from which an 
appellate court can adequately determine whether there was error, and whether the 
rights of the party have been prejudiced. State v. Schoonover, 125 Idaho 953, 954, 
877 P .2d 924, 925 (Ct. App. 1994 ). A sufficient record for appellate review can 
be established either by the witness taking the stand and testifying as to what he or 
she would have said if the court had ruled the other way on the evidence ofby 
giving an adequate offer of proof. See generally State v. Cherry, 139 Idaho 579, 
582, 83 P.3d 123, 126 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that an offer of proof is sufficient 
to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal where a trial court has ruled to allow 
impeachment using evidence allegedly obtained in violation of constitutional 
rights). 
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State v. Rauch, 144 Idaho 682, 684-85, 168 P.3d 1029, 1031-32 (Ct. App. 2007). 
In this case, Mr. Nielson was involuntarily deprived of his right to testify by the district 
court's incorrect IRE 404(b) ruling. 
The cases cited by the district court in its notice of intent to dismiss, including Demyers v. 
Adams, 47 Fed. Appx. 454 (Unpublished 9th Cir. 2002), United States v. Edwards, 897 F.2d 445, 
446-47 (9th Cir. 1990), and State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2008) (R 40446 p. 158-
159) are inapposite. 
In Demyers, the claim was that petitioner's attorney prevented her from testifying, but she 
was deemed to have waived the claim because she failed to object when counsel failed to call her 
at trial. Here the claim is that the court, not counsel, prevented Mr. Nielson from testifying - and 
Mr. Nielson's objection to that is clear from the colloquy in the trial court quoted above. 
Moreover, Demyers has no precedential effect because it is unpublished and may not even be 
cited to as authority by the courts of the circuit. Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 
In United States v. Edwards, the Circuit Court found that the district court has no duty to 
advise the defendant of the right to testify, and that the defendant's conduct, i.e., silence in the 
face of his attorney's decision not to call him, provided a sufficient basis from which to infer that 
the right to testify had been waived. 897 F.2d at 446. Mr. Nielson's case is quite different from 
Edwards. In Mr. Nielson's case, there is both his affidavit and his on-the-record statement that 
he decided not to testify because of the trial court's IRE 404(b) ruling. He did not stand silent -
he spoke and made clear that but for the erroneous ruling he would have testified. 
Furthermore, Idaho does not follow the Edwards rule even in cases lacking the record 
present in this case. At least three published cases have addressed a right to testify issue even 
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when there is no mention in the opinion that the defendant objected at trial. See DeRushe v. 
State, supra; State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1985); and Rossignol v. 
State, 152 Idaho 700,703,274 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Apr. 25, 2012). 
In State v. Richardson, supra, the appellate court found no error in the limitations the trial 
court put on the defendant's proffered testimony. 670 N.W.2d at 281. In light of the minor 
effect the Minnesota trial court's ruling would have had on the totality of the defendant's 
proffered testimony, the Minnesota Supreme Court found no violation of the right to testify. The 
Minnesota Court wrote: 
Richardson argues that the court's evidentiary ruling ... which prevented him 
from testify as to Van Der Molen's and Nichols' character evidence, including 
prior bad acts, emasculated his potential testimony and caused him to decide not 
to testify ... the court repeatedly told Richardson that he could testify to his 
version of the events, both as to justification and Nichols as a perpetrator; and the 
court indicated that evidence of Nichols' prior misconduct might become relevant 
if Richardson or someone else testified that she fired the second shot. 
670 N.W.2d at 282. Thus, in Richardson there was a correct evidentiary ruling which only 
slightly limited the scope of the defendant's desired testimony. In this case the district court 
made an erroneous evidentiary ruling and Mr. Nielson could only avoid the prejudicial effect by 
not testifying at all. Richardson does not pertain to this case. 
Unfortunately, trial counsel failed to preserve the IRE 404(b) ruling and its effect of 
denying the right to testify for appeal and original post-conviction counsel failed to amend the 
pro se petition to include that claim, even after he was given the opportunity to do so by the 
district court. Consequently, Mr. Nielson could raise the claim in a successive petition. 
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b) The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Right To Testify Claim 
is not Barred by I.C. § 19-4908 Because Original Post-Conviction 
Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Raise the Claim 
In dismissing Mr. Nielson's successive petition, the district court held that the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel/right to testify could not be raised in a successive petition 
because original post-conviction was not ineffective. R 40446 p. 159-162. However, the district 
court was incorrect. 
As set out above, original post-conviction counsel raised the claim that appellate counsel 
was ineffective in failing to challenge the IRE 404(b) ruling on appeal. R 39594 p. 148-149. 
The state moved to dismiss correctly noting that the IRE 404(b) issue had not been preserved for 
appeal. R 39594 p. 222-223. The district court agreed and dismissed the claim noting, "Though 
it would be interesting to engage in a colloquy over whether or not the Court's ruling on 404(b) 
evidence stands or falls under the later holding in Grist, the rule in [State v.] Griffith[, 144 Idaho 
356, 161 P.3d 675, 679 (Ct. App. 2007)] and Rauch plainly settle the matter before the Court." R 
39594 p. 372. However, the court also sua sponte granted original post-conviction counsel leave 
to file an amended petition to raise the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim based on the 
failure to preserve the appellate issue. "The Court hereby GRANTS the Respondent's Post-
Discovery Motion for Summary Dismissal re: Appellate Counsel of 404(b) .... Therefore the 
Post-Conviction Relief Petition will be dismissed and the Petitioner will have twenty days from 
the date of this decision to submit an amended petition." R 39594 p. 372-373. The court even 
granted post-conviction counsel's motion for an extension of time in which to file an amended 
petition. R 39594 p. 375-376. Unfortunately, post-conviction counsel then dropped the ball and 
never filed an amended petition properly framing the 404(b) issue as a claim of ineffective 
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assistance of trial counsel, instead of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
Post-conviction counsel's failure to file an amended petition was ineffective and 
establishes "sufficient reason" under LC. § 19-4908 for the filing of the successive petition. 
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 
992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1993). See Martinez v. Ryan,_ U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316-
18 (2012) (equitable relief from the failure to present issues in state post-conviction may be 
available in federal habeas corpus when the failure was due to ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel). 
Here, original post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to properly raise the right 
to testify claim, especially in light of the trial court's statement that "it would be interesting" to 
decide the substance of the 404(b) claim in light of Grist and the sua sponte grant of permission 
to file an amended petition. Counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to accept the district 
court's obvious invitation to raise the precise claim raised in the successive petition. This was 
deficient performance. 
Moreover, the deficient performance was prejudicial. As set forth in the affidavit of 
direct appeal counsel Justin Curtis (R 40446 p. 417-419), he would have raised the 404(b) issue 
on direct appeal had it been preserved. Indeed, it would have been ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel for him to ignore the 404(b) issue given it was a clearly stronger issue than 
those that were raised in direct appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000) (It is possible 
to raise an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise a particular claim); 
Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (C.A. 7 1986) ("Generally, only when ignored issues are 
clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be 
28 
overcome."); Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,665, 168 P.3d 40, 49 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel where counsel failed to raise sufficiency of the 
evidence in direct appeal). 
And, had the issue been raised in direct appeal, Mr. Nielson would have prevailed. As set 
forth in the affidavit of Greg Silvey: 
Grist, while declining to overrule Moore and Tolman in their entirety, did overrule 
all Idaho cases which interpreted them as creating a child sex abuse case 
exception to 404(b ). Grist clarified that 404(b) applies the same in all cases. This 
means that as per Moore, prior bad acts would still be admissible for the purposes 
of "corroboration" or to show "a common scheme or plan," however, the district 
court must carefully scrutinize this evidence to ensure that it is really not just 
impermissible propensity evidence relabeled as corroborative or as evidence of a 
common scheme or plan. 
For example, Grist states that prior bad acts evidence is inadmissible where its 
entire probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the 
defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior. ... Grist, 147 Idaho at 54[.] 
Again, Grist did not overrule Moore in its entirety, acknowledging Moore's 
statement was correct that "[w]here relevant to the credibility of the parties, 
evidence of a common criminal design is admissible." However, Grist repeated 
earlier cautions against an expansive interpretation of "common scheme or plan" 
and also, that there must be limits to the use of prior bad acts to show a common 
scheme or plan. 
In affiant's opinion as an appellate attorney, Grist would require reversal of Mr. 
Nielson's conviction since it overruled in relevant part, the caselaw upon which 
the district court expressly relied. While the district court did not have the benefit 
of Grist when making its ruling, the grounds for admission utilized are the same 
as later rejected in Grist. The only way the prior bad acts corroborate the 
[alleged] victim is by propensity. Likewise, umelated acts spanning almost two 
decades do not establish a common scheme or plan where the one act is so 
[un]related to the other than it establishes anything, except by resort to propensity. 
In short, following Grist, the 404(b) ruling allowing the admission of prior bad 
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acts was erroneous. 
Affidavit (of Greg S. Silvey) in Support of Post Conviction ReliefR 39594 p. 203-204. 
Finally, contrary to the district court's assertion in its notice of intent to dismiss the 
successive petition, Mr. Nielson was not required to show that if he had testified that the jury 
would have acquitted him. R40446 p. 162. Under Strickland all Mr. Nielson needed to show 
was a "reasonable probability of a different result," not that a different result would have been 
obtained. And, the reasonable probability of a different result in the case was the reasonable 
probability of a reversal of his conviction on appeal, not an acquittal at trial. In this respect, it is 
important to note that, had the IRE 404(b) issue been raised on direct appeal, Mr. Nielson would 
not have been required to prove prejudice under Strickland Rather, the state would have had the 
burden to prove that the court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967). State v. Perry, 160 Idaho 209,227,245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010) ("If the alleged error was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial, 
appellate courts shall apply the harmless error test articulated in Chapman."). 
Mr. Nielson has set forth what his proffer of testimony would have been if defense 
counsel had made a proffer at trial. Taking into consideration the evidence that Mr. Nielson 
would have been able to provide through his testimony, the state would not have been able to 
meet its burden of proving harmlessness on appeal and Mr. Nielson would have been granted a 
new trial by the appellate court. Since trial counsel's failure to preserve the 404(b) issue for 
appeal resulted in the issue not being raised and no new trial being granted, Mr. Nielson has 
shown he was prejudiced under Strickland both by: 1) trial counsel's failure to preserve the issue 
for appeal and 2) post-conviction counsel's failure to raise the ineffective assistance of trial 
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counsel claim in the original post-conviction proceedings. 
Under these circumstances, at the very least, Mr. Nielson did raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel and the right to 
testify. The district court thus erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Nielson's successive petition. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Nielson did raise genuine issues of material fact as to whether trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to request a competency evaluation and in failing to properly preserve the 
IRE 404(b) issue for appeal. The district court erred in summarily dismissing those claims. Mr. 
Nielson asks that this Court reverse the orders dismissing the original and the successive 
petitions and remand for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this~ay of October, 2013. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Dennis Ni 
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Opinion 
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND 
SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY 
SCHWARTZMAN, Judge Pro Tern. 
*1 Dennis L. Nielson appeals from his conviction by jury 
for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code 
§ 18-1508, specifically for manual-genital conduct with a 
seven-year-old female child. He contends that the district 
court erred by not adequately inquiring into his 
competency in granting his motion to represent himself 
pro se, by denying his motion for a continuance of the 
trial, by ordering that his prison mental health records be 
sent to his standby counsel rather than himself personally, 
by denying his presentencing motions for an updated 
presentence investigative report and for a psychosexual 
evaluation, and by imposing an excessive sentence. We 
affirm. 
A. Nielspn's Motions Re2arding His Pro Se Status 
We first address Nielson~s claims of error attendant to his 
pro se status. Because NJ~ls9n was indigent, the district 
court appointed a public defender to represent him. Trial 
was set to commence on November 13, 2006. On October 
27, 2006, at a pretrial conference, with Nielson present, 
defense counsel informed the court that Nielson was 
dissatisfied with his preparation for trial and that Nielson 
wanted either a different attorney or leave to represent 
himself pro se. The district court inquired into the matter 
and determined that Ni~_ls911{s counsel had requested, 
received, and reviewed all pertinent discovery materials 
from the state, had contacted and spoken to potential 
witnesses and made strategic decisions regarding who to 
call as a witness at trial, had discussed the evidence and 
witness concerns with Niel$Oll, that no further pretrial 
motions were anticipated or necessary, and that defense 
counsel was fully prepared to represent Nielson at the 
upcoming trial. Accordingly, the district court denied 
Ni~Iso,n's request for a different attorney and the inquiry 
turned to Nielson's alternative request to proceed prose. 
At the hearing, evidence was presented that Nielson had 
mental health issues and had recently been released from 
the psychiatric unit at the penitentiary. The district court, 
however, determined that from its discussions with the 
defendant at the hearing and the representations of 
defense counsel, 1 Nielson was lucid, articulate, 
understood the proceedings and was competent to act as 
his own attorney. 2 After warning Nielson of the dangers 
and pitfalls of self-representation, the district court 
granted Nielson's motion to proceed prose but appointed 
the public defender as standby counsel to assist Nielson in 
his defense. Furthermore, in an exercise of caution, the 
district court ordered standby counsel to review Nielson's 
psychiatric records from the penitentiary and report back 
to the court if those records revealed any further concerns 
regarding Nielson's ability to represent himself. On 
November 1, the district court entered an order directing 
the Department of Correction to release the psychiatric 
records directly to standby counsel. 
On November 13, the first day set for trial, Nielson 
moved for a continuance. The basis for the motion was 
Nielson's oral representation that on November 8 he had 
been diagnosed by a prison psychiatrist as schizophrenic. 
The district court denied the motion because Nielson had 
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no documentation of this diagnosis. Nielson then 
requested to have his standby defense counsel 
re-appointed as his trial attorney. The district court 
granted the motion and defense counsel conducted the 
defense in all respects, at trial and through sentencing. 
*2 On appeal, Nielson contends that the district court 
erred by not adequately inquiring into his competency in 
granting his motion to represent himself pro se, by 
denying his motion for a continuance of the trial, and by 
ordering that his mental health records be sent to his 
standby counsel rather than to himself personally. The 
State responds, among other things, that even if error is 
assumed, because of ensuing circumstances Nielson has 
shown no prejudice. We agree. 
Under the harmless error rule applicable in criminal 
proceedings, "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect substantial rights shal,l be 
disregarded." Idaho Criminal Rule 52; State v. Montoya, 
140 Idaho 160, 166, 90 P.3d 910, 916 (Ct.App.2004). In 
this appeal, Nielson has identified no prejudice attendant 
to his self-representation over the eighteen days he 
represented himself (from October 27 through the 
morning of November 13) during which time he also had 
the assistance of standby counsel. Therefore, Nielson's 
claim that the district court erred by not adequately 
inquiring into his competency in granting his motion to 
represent himself pro se is without merit. In this same 
vein, Nielson's claims that the district court erred by not 
adequately inquiring into his motion for a continuance of 
the trial and by ordering that his mental health records be 
sent to his standby counsel rather than to himself 
personally also fail for a lack of a showing of prejudice.' 
Nielson has failed to establish reversible error. 
B. Requests for an Updated PSI and a Psychosexual 
Evaluation 
Nielson next asserts that the district court erred by 
denying his motion for an updated presentence 
investigation report ("PSI") prior to sentencing. We find 
no error. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 32(a) provides: 
The trial judge need not require a 
presentence investigation report in 
every criminal case. The ordering 
of such a report is within the 
discretion of the court. With respect 
to felony convictions, if the trial 
court does not require a 
report, the record must show 
affirmatively why such an 
investigation was not ordered. 
At the close of trial, the district court stated that it was 
not ordering that a PSI be prepared for sentencing because 
a PSI on Nielson had recently been prepared in another 
case.4 Nielson moved to reconsider. At a hearing, Nielson 
asserted that he was psychologically compromised 
because he was not on proper medication at the time of 
the preparation of the existing PSI and that he would now, 
being properly medicated, be in a better "mental frame" 
and more cooperative with the PSI investigator. The 
district court declined to change its ruling. 
On appeal, Nielson repeats the assertions that he made to 
the district court, further asserts that he could have 
provided unspecified "useful information" to a new PSI 
investigator, and concludes therefrom that the district 
court abused its discretion. We disagree. Review of the 
PSI that was used shows that the investigator found 
Nielson "polite and appropriate," and there exists no 
indication that he was uncooperative. At sentencing, 
Nielson voiced no concerns about the content of the PSI 
and he offered no corrections or additions to it. More 
importantly, if Nielson had "useful information" that he 
wished to personally convey to the district court for 
sentencing purposes, there was no need for him to do so 
through the conduit of an updated PSI. At sentencing, 
Nielson was afforded his right of allocution to the court, 
but he declined to say anything. Nielson has failed to 
show an abuse of discretion in the district court's decision 
not to order the preparation of a new PSI. 
*3 Nielson also claims that the district court erred by 
denying his motion for a psychosexual evaluation prior to 
sentencing. He argues that he could have provided 
unspecified "useful information" to a psychosexual 
evaluator, and concludes therefrom that the district court 
abused its discretion. We again disagree. 
A trial court's decision whether to order a psychosexual 
evaluation upon a conviction for a sexual offense is 
discretionary. See LC. § 18-8316 ("If ordered by the 
court .... "). The primary concerns addressed by a 
psychosexual evaluation prepared for sentencing purposes 
are a defendant's future dangerousness and risk of 
reoffense. See generally Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 
562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006); State v. Scovell, 136 
Idaho 587, 594, 38 P.3d 625, 632 (Ct.App.2001); State v. 
Starchman, 136 Idaho 424, 426, 34 P.3d 1107, 1109 
(Ct.App.2001). Here, the district court determined that a 
psychosexual evaluation was unnecessary because this 
was Nielson's third Idaho conviction for lewd conduct 
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with a minor, thus establishing his future dangerousness 
and risk to reoffend. We agree with the district court's 
reasoning and find no abuse of discretion. 
C. Sentence 
Finally, Nielson asserts that his unified sentence of fifty 
years, with thirty years fixed, is excessive. The standards 
are well established. Sentencing is discretionary and an 
abuse of discretion will be found only if, in light of the 
governing criteria, the sentence is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. State v. Charboneau, 124 
Idaho 497, 500, 861 P.2d 67, 70 (1993); State v. 
Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 679, 67 P.3d 1283, 1291 
(Ct.App.2003). When reviewing the length of a sentence, 
we consider the defendant's entire sentence. State v. 
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726-27, 170 P.3d 387, 391-92 
(2007). Where reasonable minds might differ as to the 
length of the sentence, this Court will not substitute its 
view for that of the district court. State v. Brown, 121 
Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992); Kerchusky, 
138 Idaho at 679, 67 P.3d at 1291; State v. Admyers, 122 
Idaho 107, 108, 831 P.2d 949, 950 (Ct.App.1992). The 
primary objectives of a sentence of confinement are to 
protect society and to achieve any or all of the related 
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable 
to a given case. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 
P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App.1982). 
In 1984, Nielson was convicted, in Cassia County, of 
lewd conduct with a minor for molesting his six-year-old 
niece. In 1985, also in Cassia County, he was charged 
with four additional counts of lewd conduct with a young 
female child and pleaded guilty to two of these counts. He 
received concurrent sentences on the three convictions, 
the longest of which was an indeterminate term of 
eighteen years, was sent to the penitentiary and was 
eventually paroled. In 1996, Nielson was charged, in 
Boise County, with second degree kidnapping for 
detaining a seven-year-old female child in a hotel after the 
child was reported missing. He pleaded guilty to a 
Footnotes 
reduced felony charge of injury to a child and was 
sentenced to a unified term of incarceration of ten years, 
with five years fixed. Nielson again was sent to the 
penitentiary until he was paroled in 2001. In the instant 
case, Nielson was convicted for molesting, by 
manual-genital conduct, a seven-year-old female child, 
who had reported four or five instances of molestation. 
Nielson committed the instant offense approximately one 
year after he was paroled and when he was confronted 
with the child's allegations, he absconded supervision 
until two years later when he was located and arrested in 
Oregon on a warrant. Other allegations of Nielson's 
molestation of young female children also appear in the 
record. Approximately one year before the sentencing in 
this case, Nielson was convicted of the felony charge of 
failure to register as a sex offender. Nielson has also been 
convicted of the felony offenses of grand theft and 
forgery. 
* 4 Nielson argues that his sentence is excessive because 
he has some good qualities. While this may be so, at some 
point protection of society becomes the paramount 
concern at sentencing. Nielson's record clearly shows that 
he is a pedophile, a repeat offender, and a danger to 
children. Previous lesser terms of incarceration at the 
penitentiary have not served to deter him. The district 
court's sentence, which is admittedly harsh, was properly 
imposed. 
Nielson has shown no reversible error regarding rulings 
attendant to his pro se status. The district court did not err 
in denying motions for an updated presentence 
investigative report and for a psychosexual evaluation. 
The district court did not impose an excessive sentence. 
The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed. 
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge PERRY concur. 
The district court asked defense counsel whether, regarding Nielson's mental health, counsel had observed Nielson have any 
difficulty in understanding and participating in rational and in-depth conversations. Defense counsel responded: "No, your Honor. 




We note that the United States Supreme Court has recently recognized a distinction between being mentally competent to stand 
trial and being mentally competent to act as one's own attorney. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008). 
Nielson's IDOC mental health records do not support his claim of current psychotic symptoms. 
The district court utilized the PSI prepared approximately nine months earlier on Nielson's sentencing for failure to register as a 
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sex offender. Use of a previously prepared PSI is generally permissible. State v. Hyde, 127 Idaho 140, 150, 898 P.2d 71, 81 
(Ct.App.1995). 
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